McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482 (1980)

This is the landmark case which the Connecticut Legislature later codified (turned common law – i.e. judge made law – into statutory law – i.e. laws enacted by the legislature) in the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act. In this case, the Connecticut Supreme Court established a three prong test for determining whether a challenged prenuptial agreement is enforceable. The test is: (1) was the contract validly entered into; (2) do its terms violate statute or public policy; and (3) were the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice (i.e. is it unconscionable)? The court went on to explain and provide examples of each prong.

• Is the agreement validly entered into?

While a party may waive their right to property or alimony upon dissolution, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. Both parties are duty bound to disclose their financial circumstances prior to entering into the agreement, unless the other party has “independent knowledge” of the same.

• Do its terms violate statute or public policy?

As providing support for minor children is statutorily mandated, parties to a prenuptial agreement may not attempt to shirk the duty to support their children via contract.

• Were the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage dissolved so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into?

Where the economic status of parties has changed dramatically between the date of the agreement and the dissolution, the prenuptial agreement may be determined to be unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable.

Beyor v. Beyor, 158 Conn. App. 752, 121 A.3d 734 (2015).

Former wife challenged the validity of the couple’s prenuptial agreement arguing that it was unconscionable. Unconscionability generally requires a showing that there was “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party”. McKenna v. Delente, 123 Conn. App. 146, 158 (2010). In deciding whether the agreement was unconscionable (and therefore invalid), the appellate court looked at the relative positions of the couple both at the time they entered into the agreement and at the time of the divorce.

At the time the couple married, former wife was making approximately $30,000 per year; former husband was making approximately 250,000 per year. At the time of their divorce, former wife had a net worth of approximately $26,000 and former husband was worth approximately 4.5 million. The court ultimately determined that the agreement was not unconscionable. In so deciding, it reasoned that while there was a disparity between the earnings of the couple, that disparity existed both at the time the couple married and at the time of their divorce. Absent an extraordinary and unforeseeable change in the financial situations of the parties, the agreement is not unconscionable. Additionally, the former wife freely entered into the agreement and was represented by counsel at that time. While the court did comment on the former husband’s “chivalry and respect” for his former wife in not providing any economic support, the court conceded that he was not required to do so.

Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua, 201 Conn. App. 261 (2020)

The parties had a tumultuous marriage from the get-go. Prior to their wedding, they both voluntarily entered into a prenuptial agreement in which they waived their right to alimony. Former wife initiated divorce proceedings twice but abandoned the process in an attempt to work on and save the marriage. After the first attempted divorce, the parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident in which the former wife sustained substantial injuries. She was unable to return to work due to her injuries. This caused further strain on the marriage and former wife again filed for divorce. After abandoning the proceedings for a second time, the parties finally followed through with the third initiation of dissolution. The trial court awarded the former wife alimony despite the fact that the right to alimony was waived by both parties in the prenuptial agreement. The appellate court determined that the car accident which prevented the wife from returning to work was “far beyond the contemplation of the parties when they executed the [agreement]. The fact that … the [former wife] cannot earn what she disclosed her income to be [when the parties married] makes the enforcement of the [waiver of alimony] unconscionable.”

Read the case here

Peterson v. Sykes-Peterson, 133 Conn. App. 660 (2012)

The parties’ prenuptial agreement contained a “sunset provision” which stated that the agreement would become “null and void” upon their seventh wedding anniversary. The seventh anniversary of the parties’ marriage was July 14, 2007. On March 1, 2007, divorce proceedings were commenced. The plaintiff argued that the sunset provision was only meant to expire if the parties were still happily married at the time of their seventh wedding anniversary, rather than in the midst of divorce proceedings. However, the trial and appellate courts disagreed as the language in their prenuptial agreement was not conditional on anything other than reaching their seventh anniversary. The fact that their anniversary occurred during the pendency of their divorce was irrelevant as the divorce was not yet finalized. The appellate court also commented that “sunset provisions” are common in Connecticut prenuptial agreements and are not “contrary to public policy”, nor do they incentivize divorce.

Read the case here

Winchester v. McCue, 91 Conn. App. 721 (2005)

Upon commencement of divorce proceedings, the former wife challenged the validity of the couple’s prenuptial agreement arguing that the former husband had not sufficiently disclosed his financial status. Parties to a prenuptial agreement have a duty to disclose the amount, character, and value of their individually owned property, absent the other’s independent knowledge. This is essentially a prerequisite to a waiver of rights to property/alimony. The appellate court determined that the former wife was sufficiently aware of former husband’s financial circumstances and therefore freely and intelligently waived her right to any income, property, or alimony. The parties dated for several years before they were married, shared expenses, and “became knowledgeable of the other’s standard of living and spending habits.” Failure to disclose financial information in the prenuptial agreement is not fatal so long as the other party has “independent knowledge” of the same. In reaching this conclusion, the court also considered the fact that the former wife is the one who initially requested the prenuptial agreement, both parties negotiated the agreement through their attorneys, and completed at least seven drafts before signing the final version.